Abstract: Traditionally it has been thought that the moral valence of a proposition is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to whether someone knows that the proposition is true, and thus irrelevant to the truthvalue of a knowledge ascription. On this view, it's no easier to know, for example, that a bad thing will happen than that a good thing will happen (other things being equal). But a series of very surprising recent experiments suggest that this is actually not how we view knowledge. On the contrary, people are much more willing to ascribe knowledge of a bad outcome. This is known as the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE), and is a specific instance of a widely documented phenomenon, the side-effect effect (a.k.a. "the Knobe effect"), which is the most famous finding in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I report a new series of five experiments on ESEE, and in the process accomplish three things. First, I confirm earlier findings on the effect. Second, I show that the effect is virtually unlimited. Third, I introduce a new technique for detecting the effect, which potentially enhances its theoretical significance. In particular, my findings make it more likely that the effect genuinely reflects the way we think about and ascribe knowledge, rather than being the result of a performance error. * This is a draft (2013-02-02). Comments welcome. Please don't cite, quote or refute without permission.
Introduction
Most theorists think that whether a belief counts as knowledge is unaffected by its desirability. If we're wondering whether you know that a certain event will occur, we'll attend to whether you believe that the event will occur, whether it's true that the event will occur, whether you have any evidence that it will occur, and perhaps also whether your evidence only "luckily" led you to believe the truth. It doesn't matter whether the event in question is good or bad. That is, other things being equal, the event's valence doesn't affect whether you know that it will occur. Or so mainstream theorizing about knowledge would have have us believe (e.g. Steup 1996 , Lehrer 2000 , Feldman 2003 , Fumerton 2006 , BonJour 2009 ).
But important recent experimental work suggests that mainstream opinion is simply wrong about this Buckwalter 2010, Beebe and Jensen 2012, Beebe and Shea forthcoming) . The valence of an outcome apparently does influence whether we ascribe knowledge. For example, people are more willing to ascribe knowledge to a CEO if he thinks that his company's policies will harm rather than help the environment. This is known as the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE; pronounced 'easy'). It is a specific instance of a widely documented phenomenon, the side-effect effect (a.k.a. "the Knobe effect"), which is the most famous finding in experimental philosophy. ESEE is an important and surprising discovery about how we think of knowledge, which should be of interest to cognitive scientists generally. It is my focus here.
Here is the paper's plan. Section 2 situates the present discus-sion within a broader research program; it reviews previous work on side-effect effects and outlines competing approaches to explaining them. Section 3 poses two questions that set the stage for further experimental inquiry into ESEE. Section 4 reports four experiments which collectively suggest that, when observed using previous methods, ESEE is too broad and easily activated for it to reveal how we think about knowledge. Section 5 suggests an alternative approach for detecting ESEE. Section 6 enacts this alternative and reports an experiment that provides the best evidence thus far that ESEE reflects a competent pattern of knowledge ascription. Sections 7 sets an agenda for further research into this topic.
Knowledge can be ESEE
There has been a spate of valuable recent work on ordinary knowledge ascriptions (e.g. Weinberg et al. 2001 , Swain and Weinberg 2008 , Nagel 2008 , May et al. 2010 , Feltz and Zarpentine 2010 , Starmans and Friedman 2012 . These studies suggest that some surprising factors affect whether laypeople attribute knowledge (for an overview, see Buckwalter 2012) . Here I will focus on one set of studies in particular.
These studies take inspiration from Joshua Knobe's pioneering work on how people's evaluative judgments affect whether they describe outcomes as intentional (Knobe 2003a (Knobe , 2003b (Knobe , 2004 (Knobe , 2010 .
This section briefly reviews relevant prior work.
SEE, this is easy
Suppose that an agent embarks on a course of action aimed at a primary outcome (a central effect). And suppose that the agent also anticipates but does not desire that her conduct will have a certain side effect. Knobe found that if the side effect is bad or undesirable, then people are much more likely to describe the agent as having intentionally brought it about. For example, to use Knobe's now famous case, suppose that a CEO decides to start a new program with the primary aim being to increase profits. And suppose that the CEO also anticipates but does not desire that the program will, as a side effect, affect the environment. Did the CEO intentionally bring about the environmental side effect? People are much more likely to say that he did if the side effect is harmful rather than
helpful. This is known as the side-effect effect (SEE).
A side effect's valence influences ascriptions of intentionality, and it has also been shown to affect ascriptions of other practical attitudes, such as deciding, being in favor of, and desiring, among others (Pettit and Knobe 2009, Tannenbaum et al. 2009) Knobe and Burra 2006: 332-3, 338) . Instead, Knobe claims only that the effect reveals something deep and important about the way we ordinarily think about psychological states, about our underlying competence in applying such concepts.
Distortion explanations deny that moral considerations figure into the underlying competence, and instead attribute the effect to other factors that distort the competence's operation. They claim that the effect is instead due to performance error (Nadelhoffer 2006 , Malle 2006 : 103-4, Alicke and Rose 2010 , or to pragmatic concerns that don't reveal anything about how people think about psychological states per se (Adams and Steadman 2004) , or to features of the materials used in the experiments (Guglielmo and Malle 2010 ).
Knobe gently sets aside whether there is a semantic or metaphysical upshot of his conceptual competence model. But due to certain preoccupations and methodological commitments in contemporary epistemology, when we turn to whether the side-effect effect shows up for knowledge ascriptions too, it's not so simple to maintain the division between people's underlying competence in classifying things in a certain category, on the one hand, and the nature of things that populate that category, on the other.
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Epistemologists have taken it for granted that patterns in ordinary usage should, or at least can, constrain substantive theorizing about the nature of knowledge, or the (abstract) concept of knowledge, or the meaning of 'knows' (Austin 1956 , Cohen 1999 , Rysiew 2001 , DeRose 2009 , Hawthorne 2004 , Stanley 2005 , Fantl and McGrath 2009 . Of course, not just any pattern is ripe for guiding theory. But it is widely assumed that theorists should respect patterns of competent and literal knowledge ascription. There will always be some interplay between one's theory and what one is willing to consider a pattern of competent and literal knowledge ascription (e.g. Davis 2007 , Bach 2008 . But it's not "anything goes." And a theory which implies that much of our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is either incompetent or non-literal has, as they say, "some explaining to do." Setting aside contemporary epistemologists' methodological predilections, there is another reason to take competent and literal application of concepts seriously. Over the past forty years, philosophers of language and mind have developed externalist theories of semantic meaning and mental content (Kripke 1972 , Putnam 1975 , Burge 1979 , Burge 1986 ). Though not uncontroversial, these externalist theories are widely accepted. If, as Donald Davidson (1983: 146) puts it, 'Belief is in its nature veridical,' or as George Santayana (1923: 9) wrote, 'Intelligence is by its nature veridical,' or 1 Buckwalter (forthcoming) does an especially good job of explaining and properly emphasizing the significance of these methodological points. In what follows, my focus will be knowledge, knowledge ascriptions and the concept of knowledge. I don't claim that any point I make generalizes to other psychological states, ascriptions, concepts, or side-effect effects concerning them.
See, this is ESEE
James Beebe and Wesley Buckwalter (2010) showed that the sideeffect effect extends to knowledge ascriptions too. They took Knobe's original case and instead of asking participants whether the CEO intentionally brought about the environmental side effect, they asked whether the CEO knew that the program would bring about the side effect. Beebe and Buckwalter observed a striking asymmetry: participants were significantly more likely to ascribe knowledge if the environment is harmed rather than helped. Buckwalter (forthcoming) and Beebe and Shea (forthcoming) have recently extended this line of reasoning to "Gettier cases." Very roughly, a Gettier case is a case where a subject has a justified true belief, but clearly seems to lack knowledge because of how lucky he was to believe the truth (Gettier 1963 , Starmans and Friedman 2012 , Turri 2011 , Turri 2012a . Beebe and Shea asked participants about a CEO very similar to the one in Knobe's original story, except that this CEO has been "Gettiered."
Gee, this is ESEE
Participants were asked to agree or disagree with the claim that the CEO knew that the environment would be helped or harmed. Participants rated their agreement or disagreement on a 7-point Likert scale. They were significantly more likely to agree with the statement if the side effect was harmful rather than helpful. The mean response (4.35) fell above the mid-point, and responses of 5 and 7
were both modes, indicating that participants tended to think that the Gettiered CEO knew. Beebe and Jensen observed similar results with different cover stories. Buckwalter has observed even more striking results with some of his vignettes, with mean responses topping 6 on a 7-point scale. This is Gettier made ESEE, or the Gettier epistemic side-effect effect (GESEE). I was able to replicate these results (see section 4.2 below).
A natural reaction to these cases is that participant response is being distorted by a desire to blame the protagonist and to hold him accountable for a rotten outcome that he could have prevented (compare Alicke 2008 , Nadelhoffer 2006 . Agreeing that the CEO 'knew' is a way of agreeing that he should be held responsible for the environmental harm. By contrast, people aren't interested in giving the CEO credit for environmental improvement that he didn't even care about. But Buckwalter (forthcoming) has observed the effect persist even when participants are asked whether some third-party, who can't plausibly be held responsible, knows that the environmental side effect will occur. So a straightforward blamebased distortion account doesn't explain all the data.
If we're attracted to the idea that our ordinary practice of ascribing knowledge should at least broadly constrain theorizing about knowledge itself, then these data seriously threaten some well entrenched positions in contemporary epistemology. Perhaps whether you know does partly depend on whether you're up to no good. Perhaps we should leave room in our epistemology for Gettiered knowledge.
How easy can it get?
Maybe ESEE can be extended to unsettle other articles of conventional wisdom too. Conventional wisdom has it that knowledge requires truth, and that knowledge requires belief. Are these requirements reflected in ordinary usage?
It's not easy being . . . CHESEE?

Consider this contrarian hypothesis:
Contrarian Hypothesis (CH): Knowledge is not factive.
Otherwise put, CH says that knowledge does not require truth: it's possible to know false things. Some philosophers have argued that, on the ordinary conception of knowledge, CH is true (Hazlett 2010 (Hazlett , 2012 . But virtually all philosophers think that CH is obviously false. And Buckwalter (ms.) has reported several studies which suggest that, on the ordinary conception of knowledge, CH is false. But
Buckwalter cautiously reminds us that there might be other evidence that knowledge, ordinarily understood, is not factive. We saw SEE extended to ESEE, which was in turn extended to GESEE. Per-haps the same phenomenon might also provide evidence for CH.
We've seen that knowledge ascriptions can be made ESEE. Can they also be made CHESEE (pronounced 'cheesy')?
Is knowledge a breeze?
Consider also this unorthodox view:
Belief not Required (BR): Knowledge does not require belief. But perhaps that's not the ordinary view. Perhaps the ESEE pattern will extend to BR too. We've seen that knowledge ascriptions can be made ESEE. Can they also be made BRESEE (pronounced 'breezy')?
Actually, this is too easy
Suppose that in the same way that knowledge ascriptions can be made ESEE and GESEE, they can also be made CHESEE or BRE-SEE or both. What would that show? I think that it would make a conceptual-competence explanation of the observed effect much less likely. It would seem more likely that participants are incompetently applying their concept of knowledge, or are competently but falsely applying it for pragmatic reasons, or are competently applying some other concept in response to a 'knowledge' question. Over thousands of years, and across many different cultures, careful reflection has led people repeatedly and to the view that knowledge requires truth and belief (or something very similar). This is overwhelmingly reflected in the most influential historical and contemporary theories of knowledge (Matilal 1986 , Steup 1996 , Lehrer 2000 , Feldman 2003 , Fumerton 2006 , BonJour 2009 , Phillips 2011 . And if a conceptual-competence explanation is unlikely, then we need to be much more cautious when determining whether the ESEE data support various substantive proposals about the nature of knowledge itself. Of course, none of that would go to show that the effect is unreal. On the contrary, the point is that the effect is, ironically, too real for it to guide a theory of knowledge.
By contrast, if knowledge ascriptions can't be made CHESEE or BRESEE in that same way, it eliminates two barriers to a conceptual-competence account. Of course, it would not entail that a conceptual-competence account is true. But it would eliminate potential worries about the effect not ruled out by previous studies.
Experiment 1
This section reports an experiment designed to test whether knowledge ascriptions can be made CHESEE. That is, the experiment tests whether the method used to detect ESEE and GESEE in earlier experiments will also produce results that support the unorthodox view that knowledge doesn't require truth.
Method
Participants (N=147) 3 were randomly assigned to one of six conditions (Table 1) program. It will increase our profits, and/but it will also improve/harm local water quality, because it requires that we start/stop dumping polluted water into the river behind our manufacturing plant." The CEO answered, "I don't care at all about improving/harming local water quality. I just want to make as much profit as I can." Then the CEO made his decision: "Let's start the new program and make some serious profits." The company then started the new program, and sure enough, over the next few months, it caused their 3 Sixty-seven female, aged M=28.8, SD=9.92 . As with the experiments reported below, participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk and compensated $.25 for approximately 2-3 minutes of their time. Participants were not allowed to re-take any survey reported here, and participants who had taken previous similar surveys were excluded by their AMT Worker ID. Participants were located throughout the United States. Ninety-eight percent reported English as their native language. They filled out a brief demographic survey after testing. I excluded data from fifty-five participants who failed comprehension questions. Including data from these participants made a small but statistically insignificant difference to the results reported below. Previous studies of ESEE effects don't report asking comprehension questions.
profits to increase dramatically.
(Bad Luck) But as it turns out, the vice president was wrong about something: the company's new program did not require them to start/stop dumping polluted water into the river. So they never did start/stop.
(Good Luck -Harm) However, at the same time that the company was starting its new program, a local military installation decided to save money on expensive waste disposal. Instead of going through the proper procedures, they decided to secretly dump all of their toxic waste straight into a local lake, which harmed local water quality. This illegal and harmful dumping remained a secret and was never made public. When the CEO made his decision to start the new program, he was unaware that the military was going to dump the toxic waste.
(Good Luck -Help) However, at the same time that the company was starting its new program, the mayor decided to take action and improve local water quality. Instead of going through the proper procedure, the mayor secretly ordered the local water department to upgrade the filtration system at the local water treatment plant, which improved local water quality. This illegal but helpful expenditure remained a secret and was never made public. When the CEO made his decision to start the new program, he was unaware that the mayor was going to order the upgrade. Table 1 Options were rotated randomly for all questions in all experiments reported here, except for Likert scales and confidence measures, which were always ordered low-to-high. Likewise, questions were always presented in the same order in all experiments.
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CQ4 was not asked in the False Harm and False Help conditions because it confusingly presupposes that local water quality was improved/harmed. The stories for these conditions give no indication that anything does improve/harm local water quality.
when the CEO makes his decision to start the program, he knows that local water quality will be harmed.
Responses were collected on a five-point scale: strongly disagree (1), disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree (5). Questions were all presented on a single screen and the story remained at the top of the screen throughout. Questions were always presented in the same order, and response options for the questions were rotated randomly. Setting up the experiment this way allowed me to accomplish three things at once. First, comparing the Normal conditions will test whether we can replicate earlier experiments in which participants were more likely to count a true belief as knowledge in the Harm condition than in the Help condition; that is, it tests ESEE.
Second, comparing the Gettier conditions will test whether we can replicate earlier experiments in which participants were more likely 6 The same is true in all experiments reported here.
to count a Gettiered belief as knowledge in the Harm condition than in the Help condition; that is, it tests GESEE. Third, comparing the False conditions will test whether participants are more likely to count a false belief as knowledge in the Harm condition than in the Help condition; that is, it tests CHESEE.
Results and discussion
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed an overall effect of condition on response to the test question (F(5)=10.26, p<.001).
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There was an effect of side-effect valence (Harm/Help; F(1)=34.88, p<.001) and an interaction effect between luck (Normal/False/Gettier) and side-effect valence (F(2)=5.2, p=.013). Luck by itself had no effect.
The results from the Normal conditions replicated earlier findings on ESEE. Participants in Normal Harm were much more likely than participants in Normal Help to agree that the CEO knew what would happen to the water quality (Harm M=4.76, SD=.774; Help M=3.77, SD=1.24) , and this difference was statistically significant (U=77.5, p<.001). The mean knowledge score in both conditions was significantly above the midpoint (Harm, t (28) An independent samples t-test didn't detect a significant difference (t(50)=1.56, p=.129). But the data were not normally distributed, and a Mann-Whitney U test did detect a significant difference. This is the only result in the present experiment where the parametric and nonparametric tests diverged significantly. 
Experiment 2
This section reports an experiment designed to test whether knowledge ascriptions can be made BRESEE. That is, the experiment tests whether the method used to detect ESEE, GESEE and CHE-SEE in earlier experiments will also produce results that support the unorthodox view that knowledge doesn't require belief.
Method
Participants (N=56) 9 were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Harm and Help. Participants read a minor variant of a CEO case, in which the CEO starts out by saying, 'I agree that this plan 9 Twenty female, aged 18-62, M=28.5, SD=10.75. I eliminated data from 14 participants who failed comprehension questions. Ninety-nine percent reported English as a native language. will make us lots of profit. But I reject your claim that it will improve/harm local water quality.' Here is the full vignette (help/harm variations underlined and separated by a slash):
The vice president of a manufacturing company went to the CEO and said, "We are thinking of starting a new program. It will increase our profits, and/but it will also improve/harm local water quality, because it requires that we start/stop dumping polluted water into the river behind our manufacturing plant." The CEO answered, "I agree that this plan will make us lots of profit. But I reject your claim that it will improve/harm local water quality. Anyway, I don't care at all about improving/ harming local water quality. I just want to make as much profit as I can." Then the CEO made his decision: "Let's start the new program and make some serious The test question was the same as in Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
The CEO in each version of the case rejects the claim that the program will harm local water quality. If the earlier pattern of ESEE results holds, then there will be an effect of condition, with the average score in the Harm condition being higher. 
Experiment 3
We've seen that participants agree that the CEO knows when the proposition in question is false, and when the CEO doesn't believe the proposition. But suppose that the proposition is both false and But the vice-president was wrong about something: local water quality was not improved/harmed. 
Results and discussion
Once again there was an effect of condition (U=171.5, p<.001). Participants in Harm were more likely than participants in Help to agree that the CEO knew (Harm M=2.94, SD=1.21; Help M=1.73 SD=1.28) . The mean knowledge score didn't differ significantly from midpoint (t(34)=-.279, p=.782). The mean knowledge score in Help was significantly below the midpoint (t(21)=-4.67, p<.001).
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Twenty-nine female, aged M=26.9, SD=8.84 . One hundred percent reported English as a native language. I excluded data from fifteen participants who failed comprehension questions.
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The italicized 'not' is for emphasis here; participants were presented with an unformatted 'not'.
The modes in Harm were 2 and 4, compared to a mode of 1 in Help.
Experiment 4
I went even further in the quest to get participants to disagree with the knowledge ascription. I presented them with stories that take away not only truth or belief, but also justification and, in one case, all three: belief, truth and justification. I dispensed with the comparison to a Help condition at this point. Would they finally disagree?
Method
Participants (N=47) 14 were randomly assigned to read one of two stories. In both stories, the CEO is not justified in believing that the program will harm local water quality. The vice-president says, We are thinking of starting a new program. It will increase our profits, but there is a very, very small chance that it will harm local water quality, since it is just possible that it will require us to dump polluted water into the river behind our manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, that almost certainly won't happen.
The CEO then explicitly rejects the claim that it is even possible that the program will harm water quality. Participants in the True condition read a story in which it nevertheless turns out that, 'against all odds,' the program harms water quality. Participants in the False 
Results and discussion
There was no effect of condition on response to the knowledge ascription (F(1)=.714, p=.403). In neither condition did mean response differ significantly from the midpoint (True 3.25, False 2.87). The mode in False was 2 (followed closely by 5!), while 2 and 5 were both modes in True.
In the story for the False condition in this experiment, the CEO isn't justified in believing the claim in question, he rejects the claim, and the claim is false. But participants still were overall neutral on whether this unjustified false non-belief is knowledge! Perhaps if they were told that the CEO had died last week before the proposed program had even been invented, then they would unambiguously disagree that he knows. 
Re-evaluating
Experiments 1-3 show that participants are consistently more willing to agree that the CEO knows that the environmental side effect will occur when it is harmful rather than helpful. This is true whether the CEO has a normal justified true belief, a Gettiered belief, a false belief, no belief, and even when the CEO has no belief and the proposition in question is false. What's more, participant agreement with the knowledge ascription was at ceiling in the case of a false belief. Participants in Harm conditions were neutral on whether false non-beliefs were knowledge, on whether unjustified true non-beliefs were knowledge, and even on whether unjustified false non-beliefs were knowledge.
If we take these results at face value, then there is virtually nothing we can do to make participants disagree that the CEO knows that the harmful side effect will occur. This poses a serious challenge to the conceptual-competence account of epistemic sideeffect effects, for reasons noted at the beginning of section 4. It seems unlikely that participants in these studies are competently applying the concept of knowledge. A more likely explanation is that a seriously negative reaction to the CEO is causing performance errors, or that at least many participants are agreeing to a statement other than the one explicitly featured in the test question, perhaps along the lines of, 'The CEO is a world-class jerk.'
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It also seems unlikely that participants are competently applying the concept of confidently held belief, since they persist in agreeing that the CEO knows even when participants explicitly acknowledge that the CEO rejects the claim.
The big ESEE: a different approach
I'm interested in trying a different approach to detecting epistemic side-effect effects. It would be good to detect an effect in such a way that it stands a fighting chance of revealing something about our conceptual competence in ascribing knowledge, and perhaps, in turn, about knowledge itself. This requires not only detecting an ef-
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Compare Alicke and Rose 2010. fect, but an appropriately circumscribed effect.
For this to work, participants must also be willing deny knowledge in a certain range of control cases, when probed in the same way that produces ESEE. For example, they must be willing to deny that false beliefs are knowledge. More generally, it would help if we detected ESEE in an overall pattern of knowledge attribution that broadly agrees with mainstream theorizing about knowledge. The agreement doesn't have to be perfect. But if the two are totally at odds, then we'll suspect that the observed effect is not due to conceptual competence, but rather to performance error or more pressing practical concerns, such as blaming the CEO or expressing disapproval.
This section reports an experiment designed to detect ESEE within such a pattern. The experiment takes a different approach to questioning participants. It features a binary knowledge question whose options are 'really knows' and 'only thinks he knows', along with a confidence measure. This approach, pioneered by Christina Starmans and Ori Friedman (2012) , has proven effective in the past (see also Turri forthcoming a; but compare Cullen 2010 tions (Table 2) , which were the same as in Experiment 1. The stories for the conditions were built up from narrative modules. Table 2 shows how the stories were built, along with the questions used.
The narrative modules were the same as in Experiment 1, as were the comprehension questions. But the test question was different:
(KQ) When the CEO makes his decision to start the new program, he _______ that local water quality will be improved/harmed [really knows/only thinks he knows].
Participants were then asked to rate how confident they were in their answer to the test question (1-10, low to high). As before, the Normal stories are very similar to the original CEO cases. The False stories introduce a twist: it turns out that the environmental side effect doesn't occur. The Gettier stories introduce two twists: the new program doesn't produce the environmental side effect, but the something else does, which the CEO is 17 1: not at all confident; 10: completely confident. unaware of.
Results and discussion
I define a weighted knowledge ascription as the product of the answer to the dichotomous knowledge question (really knows =1; only thinks he knows =-1) and the reported confidence (1-10, low to high).
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Scores for this measure thus fall on a twenty-point scale, ranging from -10 (fully confident knowledge denial) to 10 (fully confident knowledge ascription).
A one-way analysis of variance revealed an overall effect of condition on weighted knowledge ascription (F(5)=19.25, p<.001).
There was an effect of side-effect valence (Harm/Help, F (1) Despite these two unexpected observations, there are no intolerable "red flags" in these results that should definitely make us reject the suggestion that participants are competently and literally applying their concept of knowledge. The overall results are mainly consistent with what mainstream theorists of knowledge would predict (again, the one exception being Normal Help). Yet we still observe a significant effect of side-effect valence. Only the Gettier con-dition resisted the effect. This is precisely the sort of circumscribed effect that promises to inform substantive theorizing about knowledge or our concept thereof.
Conclusion
By this point, it is definitely beyond reasonable doubt that the sideeffect effect extends to knowledge ascriptions. ESEE is real and interesting in its own right. But what can it teach us? Ideally it would teach something about our concept of knowledge, and ultimately about knowledge itself. In order for it to teach us either of those things, the effect must manifest itself in a way that is plausibly due to a competent and literal application of our concept of knowledge.
And in order to do that, it must be appropriately constrained. Up until now, that hasn't appeared to be the case (Experiments 1-4).
But Experiment 5 provides evidence of just the right sort: an appropriately constrained effect.
My focus has been whether ESEE is appropriately constrained.
But an equally important question for future research is whether it is appropriately unconstrained. At least three challenges lie ahead in this direction. I will briefly describe them here.
First, if our concept of knowledge, or knowledge itself, really is sensitive to evaluative facts, then this sensitivity probably won't be limited to side-effect propositions. A side-effect proposition is a proposition about a course of action's side effects. For example, in the CEO case above, the side-effect proposition is that local water quality will be harmed or helped. A central-effect proposition is a proposition about the primary effects that an action is intended to achieve. In the CEO case, the central-effect proposition is that the new program will increase company profits. It's hard to believe that our conceptual competence in ascribing knowledge would be sensitive to the moral valence of side effects, but not to the moral valence of central effects. Similarly, if knowledge itself does depend on nonepistemically evaluative facts in surprising ways, it seems unlikely that this would be restricted to knowledge of side effects. Indeed, knowledge of many sorts of propositions, not necessarily connected to the consequences of the agent's actions, will probably likewise depend evaluative facts.
Second, if our concept of knowledge, or knowledge itself, really is sensitive to evaluative facts, then this sensitivity probably won't be limited to knowledge based on testimony, or "second-hand knowledge." We should expect to see the effect in cases of "firsthand knowledge" too, such as beliefs based on perception, introspection, inference or memory.
Third, if our concept of knowledge, or knowledge itself, really is sensitive to evaluative facts, then this sensitivity won't be limited to a specific genre of cases. For example, it won't be limited to CEO cases. We should observe the effect when using a wide range of cover stories.
Those are three further tests for understanding ESEE's theoretical significance. If we don't observe an appropriately unconstrained effect, then ESEE probably doesn't manifest conceptual competence. By contrast, if we do observe a similar effect for central-effect propositions and first-hand knowledge and a wide range of cover stories, then three things follow. First, the effect will need a new name, since it would have nothing special to do with side effects. (Perhaps 'the evaluative effect' will suffice.) Second, and more importantly, a conceptual-competence explanation of the effect becomes much more attractive. Third, consequently, substantive theorizing about the nature of knowledge will arguably have to take the effect into account.
Suppose those challenges are met and we're convinced that ESEE reveals something important about knowledge and our concept thereof. Then we'll face an important set of further questions, including why knowledge is sensitive to these evaluative considerations, how this sensitivity is reflected in the psychology of knowledge attributions, and whether, upon reflection, our concept knowledge should be sensitive to such considerations. Why would knowledge work this way? How is that sensitivity reflected in the way people think about and ascribe knowledge? And once we are made aware that our ordinary practice of ascribing knowledge is sensitive in this way, is this something we should endorse, or should we instead change our concept so that it isn't thus sensitive, or adopt a related concept that lacks such sensitivity? Some important progress has already been made along these lines by experimental philosophers and naturalists in epistemology (e.g. Schaffer 2008, Knobe 2010 , Schaffer and Knobe forthcoming, Craig 1990 , Kornblith 2002 , Hawthorne 2004 . But this research program would benefit tremendously from greater involvement from other areas of cognitive science, including cognitive anthropology, cognitive ethology, and cognitive, evolutionary and developmental psychology.
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